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MEANS TESTING CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY:
THE PROBLEM OF MEANS
By Jean Braucher*
In the debate over means testing of consumer bankruptcy, we
sometimes forget that the current system already effectively
screens out most of those who do not belong in it. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, individual debtors must repay creditors using
their disposable income where it would be a "substantial abuse"'
not to do so and also using nonexempt assets.2 Most individual
debtors in bankruptcy do not have non-exempt assets3 and receive
little or no income in excess of their reasonable expenses.! The
current debate is not really about whether to means-test
bankruptcy, but about whether it is possible to do a better job of
° Roger Henderson Professor of Law, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers
College of Law. Thanks to Marianne Culhane, Thomas Plank and Dalia Tsuk for
comments on earlier versions of this Article and my response to Professor Eric
Posner, Jean Braucher, Response to Eric Posner, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
457 (2002).
1. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000).
2- See id. § 726(a) (providing for distribution of property of the estate); see
also id. § 522(b) (providing for debtors to claim exemptions). In Chapter 13,
debtors must pay the value of nonexempt assets under the best interests test. Id.
§ 1325(a)(4).
3. About 95% of Chapter 7 cases are "no asset" ones, and most of the 5%
with assets are business liquidations. See NAT'L BANKR. REV. COM'N,
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL 'REPORT 137 (1997)
[hereinafter, NBRC REPORT].
4. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New
Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7
Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27, 31 (1999) (finding that under 1998
version of legislation, means testing would force 3.6% of sample Chapter 7
debtors to pay something); see also TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 239-40 (1989) (noting that Chapter 13 debtors are not
better off financially and have the same high debt-to-income ratios as Chapter 7
debtors, so that the two chapters are not sorting debtors according to who can
and cannot pay).
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catching the system's abusers without excluding many "honest but
unfortunate"5 debtors in the process. Furthermore, because many
debtors are already undertaking repayment in Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13,6 there is less room for additional repayment of old debt
in bankruptcy than is commonly assumed. With only modest gains
possible in catching abusers and increasing collections in
bankruptcy, it is particularly appropriate to ask whether any given
proposal for reform will do more harm than good, imposing new
costs for minimal returns. We should be asking: would the
proposed changes make for a better system than we currently
have?
The pending consumer bankruptcy legislation7 fails this test. It
would make access to bankruptcy more difficult for all, imposing
new costs and hurdles and thus pricing the worst off out of the
system. Currently, Chapter 7 works reasonably well to give
5. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
6. Repayment in Chapter 7 can occur under a formal reaffirmation
agreement or more informally, through court-protected ride-through or creditor
acquiescence, with the creditor declining to repossess collateral so long as the
debtor pays. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After
Discharge: An Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709 720,
730 (1999) (finding reaffirmation occurred in twenty-five of weighted sample of
Chapter 7 cases, much of that to undersecured and even completely unsecured
creditors); see also id. at 740-41, 745-46 (noting that sixty percent of Chapter 7
debtor sample with homes and perhaps as many as fifty-three percent of the same
sample with cars apparently held on to the collateral without reaffirmation, by
creditor acquiescence in continued payment or by "ride through" with court
protection). In addition, of 1.4 million non-business Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
cases filed in 2001, about 400,000 (or more than twenty-eight percent) were in
Chapter 13, where the debtor must propose a repayment plan. Bankruptcy
Filings Set Record in 2001, Feb. 19, 2002, at
http://www.abiworld.org/release/LATEST.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2002). Thus,
adding up the cases in which repayment occurs in Chapter 13, under a plan, and
in Chapter 7, whether by reaffirmation, creditor acquiescence, or court-protected
ride-through, it seems likely that half or more of consumer cases already involve
some repayment. An industry study reported an even higher rate of debtors
reaffirming one or more debts, fifty-two percent. See NBRC REPORT, supra note
3, 152 n.320 (concerning the VISA study of 1996).
7. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.
333, 107th Cong. (2001). Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all citations to
the 2001 legislation are to the Senate bill.
2002] MEANS TESTING CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 409
distressed debtors a fresh start, although the large number of pro
se filings in some areas raises a question whether Chapter 7 is
already too costly for too many debtors.8 In contrast to Chapter 7,
Chapter 13 has long been in trouble. Most Chapter 13 plans are
not completed and thus fail to provide the debtor with a discharge.9
Many Chapter 13 plans accomplish little in the way of unsecured
debt repayment, at hefty administrative expense." While it is
& See Culhane & White, Reaffirmation, supra note 6, at 732 (finding that
nine percent of debtors in their 1995 sample filed pro se); see also Susan Block-
Lieb, A Comparison of Pro Bono Representation Programs for Consumer
Debtors, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 37, 40 (noting unavailability of low cost
bankruptcy advice); id. at 41 (noting that 7.2% of Chapter 7 cases were filed pro
se in 1987; with higher pro se rates in some localities, such as 50% in the Central
District of California) (1994); Russell A. Brown, Bankruptcy and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, ARIz. LAW., Feb. 1999 (reporting nearly half of
Chapter 7 cases in Arizona were filed pro se, with the majority of them prepared
by document preparers who typically charged $200). Problems with document
preparers led to passage of 11 U.S.C. § 110 in 1994 (inter alia, requiring that
debtors be supplied with copies of documents, prohibiting use of the term "legal"
in advertising, prohibiting collection of court fees, requiring disclosure of fees to
the court, authorizing the court to disallow fees, and providing for various
penalties for violations of provisions of the section).
9. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 90 (noting that the completion rate
is thirty-two percent); see also William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized
Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection
in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 410-11 (1994) (reporting
average completion rate of thirty-one percent, with a majority of Chapter 13
plans not completed in all regions of the country); William C. Whitford, Has the
Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85, 92-93 (1989) (discussing high
failure rate and consequences of plan failure). Some non-completions are not
failures from the debtor's point of view but rather involve using Chapter 13 just
long enough to pay off arrearages on secured debts.
10. See Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Estimating Means-Tested Chapter 13
Case Yields from Current Chapter 13, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2000, available
at
http://abiworld.org/abidata/online/journaltext/O0junnumbers.html (last visited
Apr. 16, 2002) (noting that the average 1998 yield per Chapter 13 debtor to the
debtor's unsecured creditors collectively was $540, or $45 per month). Since
most plans are not completed, see supra note 9, those rates of payment are not
typically sustained for the length proposed in the plan. Much of debtors' plan
payments goes to administrative expenses. See Scott F. Norberg, Consumer
Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection
in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 415, 434-38 (1999) (noting that plan
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possible to increase performance in Chapter 13 through good
administration, the proposed legislation ignores the important
lesson that a realistic budget is crucial to a successful plan. "2
Instead, the legislation incorporates stringent IRS collections
guidelines on living expenses as the basis for determining ability to
pay, even though the IRS has found that its expense guidelines are
often not realistic.3
There has been no showing of an increased rate of bankruptcy
abuse. 4 The reason we have had more bankruptcies in recent years
is because of a huge growth in consumer debt, particularly among
lower income debtors, not because better-off individuals are filing
more often in bankruptcy. 5 Current law's loose means-testing
standard ("substantial abuse") causes no trouble for most Chapter
7 cases because the problem of abuse is small. 6 Practitioners who
payments to the Chapter 13 trustee, the debtor's attorney and for other
administrative expenses equaled sixty-two percent of disbursements nationally to
unsecured creditors in: 1998, a figure that leaves out the up-front payments for
filing fees and to the attorney).
11. See Jean Braucher, A Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact
on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 557, 558-59,
574, 576 (2001) (noting that the Charlotte, N.C. trusteeship attains 55%
completion rate, highest in study of five trusteeships, by such strategies as
permitting many low percentage plans, requiring pay orders to have the debtor's
employer pay the trustee directly and by deferring full payment of the debtor's
attorney for three years). Still, even in Charlotte, with a Chapter 13 program that
is in many ways exemplary, 45% of debtors are failing to complete their plans.
1Z See id. at 565 (stating that a problem with existing debtor education
programs is that the education comes too late to be used by the debtor to draw
up a realistic budget); see also Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer
Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 536 (1993)
(describing tendency of debtors in Chapter 13 not to budget enough for ordinary
expenses and contingencies in order to appear to have enough to pay for
collateral such as homes and cars).
13. See infra Part IV.B.2 (concerning use in the legislation's abuse test of
stringent IRS collection standards for expenses, standards that are not in fact
rigidly applied by the IRS).
14. See infra notes 61-62.
15. See id.
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000) (providing for dismissal of consumer cases
that would be a substantial abuse); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 33
(noting that because of relatively low incomes of debtors in bankruptcy, most
need not be concerned about substantial abuse challenges); Braucher, Lawyers
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do consumer bankruptcy work report that they rarely see a case
where there is a risk of a substantial abuse challenge - because
debtors typically have little or no income in excess of expenses. 7
In place of the current "substantial abuse" standard, the new
bankruptcy bill would substitute a complex two-step process of
review for abuse. After a strict "presumed abuse" phase of review
(which nonetheless incorporates some standards), 8 debtors who
could afford to do so would proceed to a "special circumstances"
phase of review, under a reasonableness standard. 9  New
paperwork and other hurdles would be added in all cases. All
debtors would have to prepare a complex means-testing
calculation.' ° In addition, every debtor would have to undergo
credit counseling before filing (even if it were clear that the debtor
could not qualify for a non-bankruptcy repayment plan).2 Every
debtor would also have to receive education in financial
management after filing, as a condition of discharge.22
Furthermore, debtors' attorneys would face new liability for the
accuracy of their clients' representations to them, potentially
putting them in the role of investigating their clients.' All these
new burdens would make Chapter 7 more cumbersome and thus
more expensive and inaccessible. At the same time, the legislation
would make Chapter 13 even more burdensome and unworkable
than it already is, by requiring repayment for five years and at
unrealistic levels for many debtors, thus increasing the failure
rate.2' A workable consumer bankruptcy system depends upon
affordability and, in light of our experience with high failure rates
and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 13, at 537 (noting that lawyers and
Chapter 7 trustees in four cities studied, Dayton and Cincinnati, Ohio, and
Austin and San Antonio, Texas, agreed that substantial abuse challenges are rare
because debtors rarely have excess income over reasonable expenses).
17. See id.
18. See infra Part IV.B.2 (concerning the presumed abuse test in the
legislation and describing how even the first phase of review in the legislation's
means testing incorporates standards for several types of expenses).
19. See infra Part IV.B.4.
20. See infra Part IV.B.1.
21. See infra Part IV.B.9.
22. See infra Part IV.B.10.
23. See infra Part IV.B.8.
24. See infra Part IV.B.6.
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in Chapter 13, realistic repayment expectations.
The predictable effect of making bankruptcy more
complicated and expensive would be to deny relief to those with
little ability to repay. Debt collectors would be able to squeeze a
little more, though rarely full repayment, from debtors denied the
protection of the bankruptcy system. Furthermore, this increase in
collections at the margin would likely lead to yet more expansion
of the high-risk, high-cost credit market, increasing the social
problem of over-indebtedness.'
Certainly improvements in consumer bankruptcy law could be
made. The system needs simplification, and realistic means testing,
targeted at those who could pay, might be achievable in a simpler
system. Systems in other countries, such as Canada and Australia,
offer possible workable models for demanding repayment out of
surplus income from the small number of abusers who currently
slip through. When repayment is required in these countries, at
most half of the surplus over an income threshold must be
contributed, providing a cushion for expense variations. 6
Part I of this Article discusses the success of current Chapter 7
and the failure of current Chapter 13. Part II reviews the evidence
that recent increases in filing rates are not caused by increased
abuse but rather by more consumer debt, particularly among lower
income persons. Part III explains why bankruptcy reform that
reduces access to the discharge is unlikely to reduce the filing rate,
but rather will increase the volume of consumer debt and thus the
problem of over-indebtedness. Part IV describes current and
proposed means testing. Finally, Part V discusses the need for the
simplification of consumer bankruptcy law and explains how
means testing could be incorporated into a simplified system.
I. THE SUCCESS OF CHAPTER 7 AND FAILURE OF CHAPTER 13
Chapter 7 has been a remarkably cheap and effective
consumer remedy. It is a simple administrative action that rarely
involves litigation or special pleading. Perfect individualized
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part V (discussing the idea of a single portal to consumer
bankruptcy and some features of Canadian and Australian means testing).
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justice is not achieved, but rough justice at an affordable price is."
Indeed, bankruptcy law is one of the few areas of consumer law
that works reasonably well to meet consumer needs.'
To get a discharge, a consumer files a Chapter 7 petition, along
with the required schedules of assets, liabilities, income and
expenses.29 A bankruptcy trustee, who is usually paid $60 per
case,30 calls a "first meeting of creditors," but typically no creditor
attends.3 ' The trustee goes over the debtor's schedules and may
ask a few questions. In theory, the "liquidation" phase of the
bankruptcy comes next, but in more than ninety-five percent of
consumer cases the debtor has no non-exempt assets to liquidate. 2
There may be a discharge hearing before a judge, but more
commonly the discharge arrives in the mail.3 Usually no one - not
the trustee, the judge or any creditor - challenges the use of
Chapter 7 or the discharge of any debt, and the debtor gets relief
27. See Whitford, Individualized Justice, supra note 9, at 397-98 (describing
the problem of achieving individualized justice when small amounts are at stake
and hiring lawyers at normal rates is impractical).
28. See Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 12, at 504-
05 (noting that consumer bankruptcy is a strikingly usable consumer remedy,
which lawyers advertise to provide, in contrast to lawyer avoidance of many other
forms of consumer representation); see also Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the
Consumer and the Institutional Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L. Q.
11, 32-36 (1997) (discussing how remedies that require litigation are ill-suited for
use by consumers).
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (regarding voluntary filing); see also id. §
521(a) (concerning debtor's duties to file a list of creditors and schedules of assets
and liabilities and income and expenditures).
30. See id. § 330(b) (providing for a Chapter 7 trustee fee of $45 plus $15 in a
no-asset case). Percentage fees depend upon disbursements to creditors. Id. §
326(a). More than 95% of consumer cases are no-asset, so that there is no
liquidation and disbursement. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 341; TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE
CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 13 (2000) (explaining that few creditors bother to
attend the § 341 meeting).
32 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TExT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 243 (2001) (noting that
most courts have dispensed with the requirement that the debtor appear for a
discharge hearing and instead mail the discharge papers on the theory that a
struggling debtor should not miss a day of work to attend a ceremony).
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without litigation or any real argument."' A lawyer can handle a
routine case in several hours, including counseling, document
preparation and appearances.35 A Chapter 7 consumer debtor
typically pays attorney's fees of less than $100036 and a filing fee of
$155. 3" For this price, the debtor is relieved of a huge burden of
unmanageable debt (typically more than the debtor's annual
income).38 From filing to discharge, the whole process is usually
over in about six months, including waiting time. 9 The simplicity
and resulting affordability of the process depend on most cases
being uncontested and not requiring special pleading.
In most cases, the results in Chapter 7 are highly predictable.
Apparent uncertainties in the law on the books typically matter
little in practice under the law in action. To be sure, there are
34. See Eric A. Posner, Should Debtors Be Forced Into Chapter 13?, 32 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 965, 976 (1999) (noting, "Most Chapter 7 cases are not heavily
contested.") and Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 12, at
537 (finding that substantial abuse challenges by a judge or trustee are rare);
Culhane & White, Reaffirmation, supra note 6, at 736 (noting that creditors filed
nondischargeability complaints in two percent of sample Chapter 7 cases, and the
large majority of those were settled, often by reaffirmation). Threats to
challenge dischargeability are more common, as a means to get reaffirmations.
See id. at 736, 750.
35. See Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 12, at 554
(concerning use of staff to help with document preparation and fact that most
lawyers only meet once with client before filing, although a sizeable minority met
twice).
36. See id. at 516, 547 (reporting that Chapter 7 median fees in four cities as
of 1990-1991 ranged from $300-350 to $700-750); see also SULLIVAN ET AL.,
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 31, at 11 (estimating fees in Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 at $750 to $1,500 range). Fees are typically higher in Chapter 13 than
in the Chapter 7. See Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note
12, at 546-54. Fees also vary greatly around the country, but fees below $1000 in
Chapter 7 remain typical as of this writing.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1) (2000).
38. See SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 31, at 70-71
(explaining that sample of 1991 debtors typically owed eighteen months worth of
income in non-mortgage debt).
39. There is no required delay, but one reason discharges typically are not
given more quickly is that proofs of claim can be filed within ninety days of the
first meeting of creditors, except for governmental creditors, who have 180 days
to file a proof of claim. See FED. R. BANKR. P. § 3002(c)(1).
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varying approaches taken by different courts"° or U.S. trustees, but
lawyers only have to worry about the approach used in the locality
where they practice. Local legal cultures in bankruptcy work
according to well-understood rules of thumb. 1 Usually, lawyers do
not have to be concerned about a challenge under the "substantial
abuse" test. Both debtors' attorneys and Chapter 7 trustees report
that they rarely see cases where debtors have income in excess of
reasonable expenses. 2 In the occasional case where a debtor has
significant income in excess of reasonable expenses, it is easy to
avoid controversy by simply filing directly in Chapter 13. The
economics of flat fee practice, along with the tendency to acquiesce
to local culture, often lead lawyers to avoid aggressive strategies
that may draw challenges. 3 Putting debtors into Chapter 13
repayment plans, even though realistically they lack the means to
succeed, is now a much more common occurrence in consumer
practice than shepherding clients with excess income through
Chapter 7."
Despite the efficiency of Chapter 7 as a means of debt relief,
its price is already a little high, as evidenced by burgeoning pro se
filings,45  (which are partially supported by the document-
40. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 270-71 (discussing different
approaches of different courts to application of the substantial abuse test in 11
U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000)).
41. See Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 12, at 532-
34 (discussing local rules of thumb concerning floor percentages of repayment in
Chapter 13 that will be easily confirmed).
42. See id. at 537 (in an empirical study, most debtors' lawyers reported that
they had never or rarely seen a substantial abuse challenge and that they could
write reasonable budgets of expenses that would use up all of their clients'
income, and Chapter 7 trustees reported that they looked for excess income over
reasonable expenses, but rarely found it).
43. See Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own
Informed Choices-A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 165, 177-80 (1997) (arguing that debtors' lawyers are too unwilling
to put time into zealous representation on behalf of their clients and too often
avoid engaging in needed advocacy or negotiation in consumer bankruptcy
cases).
44. See id. at 181-82, 185-86 (concerning failure of lawyers to see that their
clients budget realistically in Chapter 13).
45. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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preparation industry).'  Any changes in Chapter 7 that would
make the process more cumbersome would price some of the
worst-off out of the system and also further burden the courts with
pro se filers.47
Chapter 13 has been much less successful than Chapter 7.
More than two-thirds of Chapter 13 debtors do not complete their
plans and thus do not get a discharge.' A leading cause of failure
is unrealistic budgeting. Debtors too often fail to include their
necessary expenses and stretch to make payments on collateral
they cannot really afford, so that their plans do not have a good
chance to begin with.49 In addition, Chapter 13 debtors usually
propose plans of three to five years,'° and economic setbacks over
that length of time lead to failures even when the plan is realistic at
the outset. Attorneys' fees in Chapter 13 are generally higher than
in Chapter 7, often $1500 or more.' Due to the greater complexity
of Chapter 13, use of document preparers is even more perilous
46. See id.
47. One of the burdens is the need to oversee reaffirmations for pro se
debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 524(d). See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 147
(concerning court monitoring of reaffirmation agreements and proliferation of
local rules on the subject).
4& See sources listed supra note 9. Some of these debtors get a discharge by
converting to Chapter 7 and others do so by refiling in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.
See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 273-87 (concerning proposal to
automatically convert Chapter 13 cases to Chapter 7 rather than dismiss them
and discussing the need of many Chapter 13 debtors for repeat access); see also
11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(a)-(b) (2000) (providing that discharge is ordinarily not given
until plan completion).
49. See Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 12, at 536
(concerning tendency to under-budget for ordinary expenses and contingencies
in Chapter 13 in order to stretch to try to hold on to houses and cars); see also
Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors, supra note 43, at 181-82 (discussing
need to budget realistically to determine the feasibility of Chapter 13 and to
minimize the risk of substantial abuse challenges in Chapter 7).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (providing that a Chapter 13 debtor who is not
paying debts in full must pay disposable income for three years, to avoid risk of
confirmation challenge); see also id. § 1322(d) (implementing a statutory five-
year maximum length for proposed plans).
51. See Braucher, Debtor Education, supra note 11, at 574 (noting that typical
Chapter 13 attorneys fees in three of five cities as of 1994 were $1500 or more).
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than in Chapter 7.5 Altogether, administrative expenses of
Chapter 13 eat up a substantial portion of plan payments, with
most of the repayment going to secured creditors who would get
paid the value of their collateral in Chapter 7 at any rate. 3
Calls for more debtors to use Chapter 13 often seem to be
made in ignorance of its high failure rate and low returns to
unsecured creditors.14 Although there is theoretical appeal to the
idea of requiring debtors to use future income to pay off old debt,"
experience shows that even when debtors choose to use Chapter
13, without the difficulty that stringent budgeting under IRS
expense guidelines would add, they usually do not succeed. 6 Most
debtors in bankruptcy can, at best, just make ends meet, much less
pay off old debts. Yet the proposed legislation would make
Chapter 13 even more burdensome and thus unrealistic than it
already is. 7
If the drive for means testing is at least in part about giving
similar treatment to the similarly situated, then part of the problem
is the number of "can't pay" debtors who try and fail in Chapter
13. A good percentage of Chapter 13 debtors fall into that
52. Nonetheless, pro se filings in Chapter 13 are common in some areas, such
as California. See VISA CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 1997 BANKRUPTCY PETITION
STUDY (1997), available at http://www.abiworld.org/stats/visa/97debtortables.html
(last visited Apr. 19, 2002) (finding that 22.5% of California Chapter 13 debtors
in study filed pro se).
53. See Norberg, supra note 10, at 434-38.
54. See id. Industry-funded researchers claimed that $3 to $5 billion more
could be paid to creditors, but an examination of this claim revealed that it would
have required forty percent of the Chapter 7 debtors at the time to pay five times
as much as the average Chapter 13 debtor was then paying. Flynn & Bermant,
supra note 10; see also Posner, supra note 34, at 976 (arguing that means-testing
legislation is desirable because it makes Chapter 13 "presumptive," but never
mentioning the high failure rate in Chapter 13 currently).
55. But see Karen Gross, Demonizing Debtors: A Response to the
Honsberger-Ziegel Debate, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 263, 273-74 (1999) (arguing
that means-testing is a form of shaming sanction). For a theoretical defense of
the discharge, see Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047 (1987).
56. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 90 (noting that with such a high rate
of failure in voluntary Chapter 13, forcing unwilling debtors into that chapter
may only burden the system).
57. See infra Part IV.B.6.
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category, as evidenced by the high failure rate." In short, under-
use of the fresh start is a much bigger problem than its abuse. But
there is no industry lobby working for means testing of Chapter 13,
to see that debtors using Chapter 13 have the means to succeed."
II. INCREASED FILINGS: NOT CAUSED BY NEW ABUSE
To the extent there is an idea, as opposed to an industry
objective, behind means testing, it is that there is some percentage
of debtors who could and should pay something out of current
income to their creditors, rather than getting a quick fresh start.
This is not a new idea. It was behind the invention of the old
Chapter XIII, was raised again during the work of the Bankruptcy
Commission of the 1970s, and led to the addition of the substantial
abuse test in the 1984 Amendments.'
Most people concede that there are some abusers in
bankruptcy. The debate has been more about how many. The
estimates of how many people would be caught by the new means
testing have ranged from low single digits to the industry claim of
5& See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
59. See lain D. C. Ramsay, Individual Bankruptcy: Preliminary Findings of a
Socio-Legal Analysis, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 15, 80 (1999) (noting that
bankruptcy policymaking in Canada is not a rational process based on careful
socio-legal analysis but is better understood in terms of interest group politics).
One might characterize the story in the U.S. as even worse, in that the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission did carefully review the available socio-legal
literature and analyze it, but then that analysis was ignored in favor of interest
group politics.
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000); see also Walter Chandler, The Wage
Earners' Plan: Its Purpose, 15 VAND. L. REv. 169, 170 (1962) (stating that
Chapter XIII provides a debtor "an opportunity to meet his just obligations and
to look his creditors in the face instead of crossing to the other side of the street
in order to avoid them."); Reginald W. McDuffee, The Wage Earner's Plan in
Practice, 15 VAND. L. REv. 173 (1962) (noting that increased use of wage earner
plans lessens creditor losses but listing many factors necessary to make
repayment plans work); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. I at 159 (1973) (concluding that forced
participation in a plan requiring payment out of future income has too little
chance of success to be adopted); NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 90 (noting that
the credit industry has sought means testing consistently for at least thirty years).
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fifteen percent (later revised down to eleven percent).6' In
addition, most of these so-called abusers are not high-income
individuals and face very large debt burdens; therefore not
everyone would agree that we should bar them all from a fresh
start. How poor, indebted and beleaguered by unforeseen
circumstances you have to be to qualify as an "honest but
unfortunate" debtor is a highly debatable question. Many easy
qualifiers were much in the news in late 2001 and early 2002-such
as office cleaners, restaurant dishwashers, taxi drivers and hotel
banquet servers who did not plan for the economic effects of the
September 11 attacks.
Whatever the dimensions of the abuse problem, it is not a new
one, and the rate of abuse is not growing. There is good evidence
that people filing for bankruptcy today are not better off than
those who filed twenty years ago.62 Rather, more Americans are
carrying large debt burdens when they experience financial
reverses, leading to more filings; but debtors in bankruptcy today
are in the same or worse financial condition as in the past. 3
Furthermore, the other means-testing problem in the bankruptcy
system, use of Chapter 13 by people without the means to repay, '
goes unaddressed. The complexity of the current system obscures
this problem.
Supporters of means testing treat the increase in personal
bankruptcy filings over the last twenty years as the problem, with
61. See Culhane & White, Means Testing, supra note 4, at 31 (finding that
3.6% of sample debtors would have had to pay something under 1998 version of
legislation); see also id. at 29-30 (discussing revision of industry-financed study
done by Ernst & Young, initially saying fifteen percent would have to pay under
the legislation but later revised to eleven percent); Flynn & Bermant, supra notes
10 (concluding that there is no conceivable scenario that would generate the
return to unsecured creditors from means testing that some industry
representatives claimed).
62. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 83 n.124 (finding that increased
bankruptcy filings cannot be attributed to better off people filing in bankruptcy
because debtors of 1990s were in as much or more trouble as debtors of early
1980s); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 31, at 71
tbl. 2.5 (showing increase in median debt-income ratio from 1981 to 1997).
63. See id.
64. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
419
420 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
changes in the law to restrict access as the solution.65 In the late
1990s, the argument for means testing also rested on an assumption
of "low unemployment, steady economic growth and general
prosperity," to quote Judge Edith Jones and Professor Todd
Zywicki in the opening sentence of their 1999 article "It's Time for
Means-Testing."" One wonders, however, whether the
inconvenient fact of an economic recession in 2001-2002 will
change these authors' minds or just produce a restatement of their
argument that no longer refers to good economic times.7 At any
65. See Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy:
Means Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission's Proposals as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1998) (quoting Representative George Gekas concerning the increased filing
rate as showing a new "bankruptcy of convenience.., borne out of a loss of
stigma").
66. Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999
B.Y.U. L. REV. 177 (1999).
67. See David Leonhardt, U.S. Jobless Rate Increases to 6%; Highest in 8
Years, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at Al (reporting on surge in unemployment as
of April 2002) and Sarah Kershaw, Failed Mortgages Soar in New York, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at Al (attributing rise in mortgage defaults in the New
York area in part to unemployment after September 11); see also Todd J.
Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 393, 431,
412 (2001) (arguing for reform of "promiscuous bankruptcy laws" as part of a
moral campaign to reverse the "self-indulgence of the Baby Boomers"). A
reduction in stigma associated with bankruptcy is much discussed, although there
is precious little hard evidence that it has occurred. Assuming there is less
stigma, however, this could be caused by the flood of new credit being made
available and resulting over-indebtedness rather than by some deeper moral
change. See infra notes 74-79 and the accompanying text. If moral blame is to be
assessed for the current bankruptcy rate, at least equal time ought to be given to
the behavior of credit issuers. See Laurie A. Lucas, Integrative Social Contracts
Theory: Ethical Implications of Marketing Credit Cards to U.S. College Students,
38 AM. Bus. L. J. 413 (2001) (applying integrative social contracts theory to
credit card marketing to college students and concluding that use of persuasive
strategies and peripheral cues, such as promotional gifts and celebrity
endorsements, rather than informational advertising, is approved by credit
industry norms but conflicts with broader norms against taking unfair advantage
of unsophisticated people). There have been many press reports recently of an
increase in filings by young people. See, e.g., Vikki Ortiz, More Debt Laden 20-
Somethings Are Seeking Help, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 2001, at 01A
(quoting lawyers concerned about more debt problems among young people);
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rate, bankruptcy law has been permanent since 1898,68 and it needs
to be designed for good times as well as bad.
Another aspect of the case for means testing involves the claim
that enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 represented a
liberalization of the law, and this legal change in turn increased
bankruptcy filings.69 In this view, we can solve the problem by
restricting access to bankruptcy. It is not at all clear that the 1978
Bankruptcy Code represented a significant liberalization in the
law; furthermore, the 1984 Amendments took steps to get tougher
and cut back somewhat on access by adding the substantial abuse
and disposable income tests." Even assuming a liberalization in
fact, however, an obvious problem with the theory that this caused
an increase in filings beginning in the 1980s is lack of consumer
knowledge of the law. Indeed, more than twenty years later, the
Kristin Tillotson, Credit Card Debt Is Pushing Youth into Bankruptcy - It's Easy
for Teens to Get Credit Cards, But Paying Them Off Can Prove to Be a Financial
Nightmare, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, St. Paul), June 3, 2001, at 1A (quoting
lawyers and credit counselors as saying that young people are among the fastest
growing age group of people opting for bankruptcy). Increased credit availability
is a more likely explanation for more filings by the young than moral decay
compared to previous generations of young people. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al.,
Young, Old and in Between: Who Files for Bankruptcy, NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISER, Sept. 2001 (finding that the absolute number of filers under twenty-five
went up from 1991 to 2001, although as a percentage of all filers, there was a
slight decline in this age group).
6& See DAVID A. SKEEL JR., DEBT'S DOMINION-A HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 24 (2001).
69. See William T. Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
An Alternative Approach, 71 GEO. L. J. 1129 (1983) (discussing consumer credit
industry campaign to tighten up on access to the discharge in response to increase
in bankruptcy filings after the code's effective date and questioning industry and
press claims at the time that the new law was the cause of the increase in filings).
70. See id. at 1131 (noting that "slight changes" in the 1978 reform legislation
"hardly account for the large increase in bankruptcy filings."). The further
changes made in 1984, including the substantial abuse test in Chapter 7, 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b), and the disposable income test in Chapter 13, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b), were
designed to push more debtors into making significant repayment in Chapter 13.
The disposable income test in Chapter 13 had more impact than the substantial
abuse test in Chapter 7 and is part of the reason for the high failure rate in
Chapter 13. On the other hand, local legal culture that demands high repayment
may be even more significant. See Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer
Bankruptcy, supra note 12.
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general public still does not understand the law. Most people think
bankruptcy law is harsher than it is;7" they also mistakenly think
that bankruptcy will cut off their access to credit." Many more
Americans could benefit from bankruptcy than use it.73
The bigger problem with the theory that bankruptcy
liberalization caused the increases in filing that have continued for
more than twenty years is this: Creditors, who are informed about
the law, would not continue to expand the volume of debt in
response to legal changes making it easier for debtors to get a
discharge. Thus, a much more plausible explanation for increased
lending and resulting growth in bankruptcy filings is interest rate
deregulation. In 1978, the same year that Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Code,7" the Supreme Court decided Marquette
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Service Corp.75 This
decision effectively deregulated consumer credit interest rates by
interpreting a hundred-year-old statute to permit a national bank
to charge the interest rates permitted in the state where it is
located and to export those rates to customers to other states.76
71. See NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE, SURVEY SHOWS CONFUSION ON
CURRENT BANKRUPTCY LAWS (June 17, 1997), at http://nclnet.orgfbankrupt.htm
(last visited Apr. 17, 2002) (finding that two-thirds of Americans believe that
most people must repay a portion of their debts under the current system).
While it may be true that most debtors attempt to pay part of their debts, see
supra note 6 and accompanying text, they are not required to do so. See Michelle
J. White, Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at the Incentives
Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 685 (1998) (finding that many more people could benefit from bankruptcy
than are using the system, specifically that a majority of U.S. households would
benefit financially if they engaged in some pre-bankruptcy planning before filing
and comparing this to an actual filing rate of eight percent of households in the
previous decade).
72. See Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors, supra note 43, at 187
(concerning availability of "second-chance" credit after bankruptcy).
73. See generally White, supra note 71, at 685.
74. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2000), was enacted in 1978
and became effective in 1979.
75. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439
U.S. 299 (1978) (interpreting the National Bank Act to permit national banks to
charge the interest rates permitted in states where they are located and to export
those rates to customers in states with lower usury limits).
76. See James J. White, The Usury Trompe L'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. REV. 445
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National banks responded to the decision by putting in place
subsidiaries in locations with favorable rate regulation or none at
all (Citibank in South Dakota, and MBNA in Delaware, for
example). ' They proceeded to expand consumer credit volume
dramatically, particularly to low-income persons who previously
had no access.7" Not surprisingly, more debt led to more
bankruptcy.79 I do not advocate a return to rate regulation, but it is
important to understand that rate deregulation caused more
lending, particularly more high-risk lending, and this in turn led to
more default and more bankruptcy. If creditors do not like the
larger numbers of bankruptcy filings, they could adjust their
underwriting and extend less credit to high-risk debtors. But they
would prefer to persuade Congress to cut back on bankruptcy
access so that they can continue to expand volume into ever more
risky sectors.
(2000).
77. See Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on
Credit Card Volumes, Charge-Offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, FDIC:
Bank Trends (1998), available at
http://www/fdic/gov/bank/analytical/bank/bt_9805.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2002) (concerning move of Maryland Bank, N.A., to Delaware).
78. See id. (analyzing how greater lending to lower income persons, with
greater propensity to borrow more for current consumption, even at high interest
rates, led to increased credit problems and personal bankruptcy); see also
SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 31, at 61-63 (noting that
in sample of 1991 debtors in bankruptcy, their median income was less than half
the national median family income; there were virtually no debtors with income
above $75,000; a third of the debtors were in poverty, two and a half times the
national poverty rate).
79. See id;. see also Robert M. Lawless, The Relationship Between Non
Business Bankruptcy Filings and Various Basic Measures of Consumer Debt, at
http://www.law.missouri.edu/lawless/bus-bkr/body-filings.htm (Version 1.1, last
modified July 18, 2001) (noting that nonbusiness bankruptcy filings have a close
relationship to consumer debt measurements, so that as consumer debt increases,
so do the number of filings); Lawrence Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit
Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249 (1997) (discussing how
the relaxation of credit standards led to increases in lending to marginal
consumers and resulting higher default and bankruptcy rates).
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III. LIKELY IMPACT OF REDUCED ACCESS TO BANKRUPTCY: MORE
INDEBTEDNESS
What would be the effect of changing the law to cut back on
access to bankruptcy? After a transition period of a few years,' we
would expect credit volume to expand more than it otherwise
would, as creditors took advantage of restricted access to
bankruptcy. Creditors would relax credit standards further, relying
on the ability of debt collectors to squeeze a little more out of
debtors no longer protected by the automatic stay and then
discharge in bankruptcy." Lack of access to bankruptcy does not
mean that distressed debtors would necessarily pay in full, but it
would allow creditors to collect a little more from their marginal
customers. So-called "can't pay" debtors can usually pay
something if enough pressure is applied. At the end of an
adjustment period to the new law, we would likely end up with
more over-indebted consumers, more defaults, and, as the result of
the expansion of consumer debt, possibly even more filings in
bankruptcy. Consumer creditors would get to continue to expand
their businesses and might also get a higher rate of return because
80. Initially, there would be a huge increase in bankruptcy filings in the
period between enactment and the effective date of the new legislation. We saw
a preview of this phenomenon early in 2001, when enactment looked likely and
lawyers in some areas advertised the need to act fast. See, e.g., Guy T. Baehr,
Personal Bankruptcies Surge in N.J. - Consumers Rush to File as Congress Irons
Out Bill, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 11, 2001 (quoting a veteran corporate
bankruptcy attorney to the effect that some attorneys had been advertising for
clients with warnings that new law could make it harder to get discharge). After
enactment, there might be a period of reduced filing. A twenty-something staffer
of Representative George Gekas explained to me several years ago that the
legislation would work to reduce filings because "perception is reality." Media
stories about the new means-testing in the legislation might deter some people
from approaching lawyers. Lawyers would initially be off-stride, trying to figure
out what the law requires, and some would stop doing bankruptcy work, while
others would probably end up raising their fees due to increased paperwork and
potential liability. Higher fees would reduce filings, at least initially. It is hard to
know to what extent the pre-effective date increase in filings would offset the
post-effective date decrease in filings. Eventually, at least some of the demand
likely would be met with non-lawyer preparers and more pro se cases.
81. See Braucher, Increasing Uniformity, supra note 65, at 8 ("The message
to creditors would be to crank up the volume of consumer debt even more.").
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of the increased collections at the margin.' The opportunity to
expand volume and increase profits is presumably why the credit
industry has expended millions promoting the bankruptcy
legislation.' Of course they want this opportunity, but the question
for the rest of us is whether what is good for Citibank and MBNA
is also good for America. The crucial point is that restricting access
to bankruptcy is unlikely to reduce lending, default or perhaps
even the number of bankruptcies.
Douglas Baird, then dean of the University of Chicago School
of Law, reached a similar conclusion that it is unlikely that the
legislation would reduce the number of filings in the long run. He
wrote:
Advocates of the bills suggest that these changes will reduce the
number of bankruptcy filings, of which there are now more than
a million per year. Bankruptcy filings, however, are affected
82. Whether creditors would get a higher rate of return from constricting
access to bankruptcy depends on whether creditors would be forced by
competition to return all of their collection gains to their customers in the form of
lower interest rates. The stickiness of consumer credit interest rates in the 1980s
and into the 1990s, despite reductions in the cost of funds, drew the attention of
economists and government regulators. See U.S. CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY -
COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENTS NEED TO BE CLOSELY MONITORED, GAO
REPORT, Apr. 1994, at 3-6 (discussing alternative theories for stable credit card
interest rates despite wide fluctuations in the cost of funds and concluding that
the industry should be closely monitored); see also Lawrence M. Ausubel, The
Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. Eco. REV. 50 (1991). If
the proposed bankruptcy legislation were to pass, it seems likely that creditors
would capture some of the gains in increased collections in the form of greater
profits. The credit industry has developed methods such as "teaser rates" that
may take advantage of consumer underestimation of their future borrowing. See
Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, supra note 79, at 261-63. The spread between
post-introductory rates and cost of funds remains substantial, and late-payment
and overlimit fees, often hidden in the sense that disclosures are ineffective, are
another source of profits, so that introductory rates alone are not a good gauge of
either profitability or real competitiveness in the industry. See id. at 263.
83. See K.Q. Seelye, House to Vote Today on Legislation for Bankruptcy
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1998, at A18 (noting that financial institutions
spent about $40 million in 1997 alone lobbying for the bankruptcy legislation);
see also Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Law
Reform, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189, 193 (1999) (noting that lobbying intensified
the following year, 1998).
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most by the amount of debt individuals carry relative to their
annual income. The higher this ratio, the more likely
individuals will be unable to pay their debts if they encounter
economic misfortune. These changes, by making bankruptcy
less attractive, may make people less inclined to borrow.
Everything else being equal, this will tend to reduce the number
of defaults and the number of bankruptcy filings. But these
same changes will also make lenders more likely to extend
credit. They will lend more money and thus increase the ratio
of debt to annual income, the number of defaults, and the
number of bankruptcy filings. Unless there is some reason to
think that the first effect will dominate the second (and there is
not), a policy maker who wants to reduce the number of
bankruptcy filings should hesitate before supporting this
legislation.
Baird seems to suggest that the two effects, on debtors and on
creditors, might cancel each other out. But there are good reasons
to think that bankruptcy restrictions have more impact on
creditors' decisions to lend than on debtors' decisions to borrow.
Creditors invest in full information about applicable law (and in
getting advantageous laws passed), while debtors do not.
Furthermore, rate deregulation has made high-risk lending
profitable, and high-risk debtors have a higher propensity to
borrow despite the high cost."5 They finance current consumption
out of a felt need.'
Economic analysis works particularly well as a means to
understand the incentives that drive financial institutions. These
institutions fit the "rational actor" assumption of economic theory
much better than do individuals, who are more bounded in their
knowledge and will-power.' This is why restricting access to the
84. See Douglas Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L. J.
573, 575 n.7 (1998) [citations omitted].
85. See Ellis, supra note 77, at 9.
86. See id. (noting that this behavior could be characterized as either
irrational or as based on a rational calculation to take the risk that future income
will allow them to repay).
87. See CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, in CASS SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 14-16 (2000)
(discussing bounded rationality, bounded will power and bounded self-interest as
problems with standard law and economics assumptions); see also Russell V.
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individual bankruptcy system is unlikely to reduce the number of
bankruptcy filings in the long run.
Thus, with creditors encouraged to lend more under the
proposed legislation, we would likely end up with more consumer
debt and more consumer over-indebtedness, a phenomenon that is
broader than bankruptcy. By over-indebtedness, I do not mean
anything technical, but simply difficulty handling one's debts, with
attendant negative social and psychological effects." More people
seek credit counseling each year than file in bankruptcy,89 and not
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000)
(detailing shortcomings of rational choice theory and presenting research
findings from the behavioral sciences that articulate a more subtle and realistic
understanding of human behavior).
88. Judging by reactions I have heard from several advance readers to my use
of the phrase "over-indebtedness," American scholars seem to have trouble with
this rather ordinary concept, one that is a commonplace among European
scholars and policymakers. See NICK HULS, OVERINDEBTEDNESS OF
CONSUMERS IN THE EC MEMBER STATES: FACTS AND SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS
204-10 (1994) (discussing social and psychological consequences of difficulty with
repayment, including destructive effects on family life, and contrasting European
tendency to view over-indebtedness as a societal problem to American views
emphasizing individualism and an economic approach). A largely unexplored
dimension of American over-indebtedness is its social and psychological effects.
But see Press Release, Myvesta.org, Myvesta.org Survey (Nov. 29, 2001)
(available on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law)
(concerning greater signs of stress and depression among persons with debt
problems). For more discussion of over-indebtedness research and theory in
Europe, see Gianni Betti et al., Study of the Problem of Consumer Indebtedness:
Statistical Aspects (OCR Macro Oct. 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/developments/finaserv/fina_serv06_
en.pdf (last visited May 5, 2002). This study notes that over-indebtedness is
defined in different ways in different studies and in different European countries,
including in objective, subjective and administrative ways (according to some
event of default, perceived difficulty by debtors, or resort to official action,
including court action). Id. at 40-41.
89. See NFCC FACT SHEET, Nov. 1, 2000, available at
http://www.nfcc.org/news/showness.cfm?newsid=64 (last visited Apr. 16, 2002)
(reporting that members of National Foundation for Credit Counseling,
organization of nonprofit consumer credit counseling agencies, counseled 1.6
million families in 1999); see also Richard L. Stehl, The Failings of the Credit
Counseling and Debtor Education Requirements of the Proposed Consumer
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everyone who struggles with debt seeks either credit counseling or
bankruptcy. A socio-legal perspective on bankruptcy tends to see
it not as the problem but as a symptom of a broader social
problem, over-indebtedness.
Over-indebtedness results from a combination of factors,
including carrying a high debt burden in relation to income, lack of
savings, and insecurities in financial status that can cause
unanticipated loss of income or sudden increases in expenses. Job
loss in the United States is increasingly attended by lack of
unemployment compensation (and even when the employee
receives compensation, it is less than the individual's previous
income).' Millions lack health insurance, and others rack up
medical bills that exceed insurance coverage or switch to less
demanding jobs after suffering an illness or injury, thus losing
income.91 Family break-up' can suddenly increase expenses as two
households replace one, on the same income. People who are
carrying large amounts of debt are less able to withstand the shock
of a loss of income or sudden increase in expenses. Never before
have so many people carried such large debt burdens, and as a
result more people become over-indebted.93 Indeed, a significant
portion of the population is probably continuously at significant
Bankruptcy Reform Legislation of 1998, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 148-49
(1999) (criticizing legislation's requirement for consumer credit counseling and
noting inadequate staffing to handle two million requests for credit counseling in
1997).
90. See A. Mechele Dickerson, America's Uneasy Relationship with the
Working Poor, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 17 (1999) (comparing debates over welfare
reform and bankruptcy reform, particularly the obsession with "cheats" and
"abusers," compared to much less focus on lack of job and educational skills of
the poor).
91. See Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates over Health Care
Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, '76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 377-78
(2001) (finding that nearly half of all bankruptcies involve a medical problem, but
not just due to lack of any insurance; medical bills in excess of coverage and job
shifts caused by medical problems also contribute to debt problem after illness or
injury).
92 See SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 31, at 181
(stating that more than fifteen percent of sampled debtors identified marital
disruption as a source of their financial troubles).
93. See generally Ellis, supra note 77.
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risk for difficulty with debt, due to declines in savings and increases
in borrowing. ' A "democratization of credit," to use the phrase of
the consumer credit industry, has occurred since 1978, and it is a
new social phenomenon causing new problems. A quick fix in the
form of bankruptcy law "reform" will not magically produce more
financial planning and prudence or less economic distress and risky
borrowing.95 Borrowing for current consumption is not a recipe for
financial security, and this insight was the origin of ancient
strictures against usury.' Since we have largely given up on supply
94. One of the best hedges against debt problems is savings. The personal
savings rate declined ten percent from 1983 to 2000, as borrowing increased. See
Richard Peach & Charles Steindel, A Nation of Spendthrifts? An Analysis of
Trends in Personal and Gross Saving, 6 CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. Sept.
2000, at 1 (arguing that negative personal savings rate in 1999 was less
symptomatic of bubble economy fueled by reckless consumer spending than
might be supposed, because capital gains are excluded from the standard
measure of personal savings, but adding, "[slince the overwhelming bulk of
capital gains accrue to a thin stratum of households, it is possible that favorable
developments for a few people are masking troubling trends for the larger
population," and finding comfort in the fact that overall consumer spending was
growing no more rapidly than wages and salaries but also noting that we lack the
individual household data necessary to assess the soundness of household
finances definitively). Of course, in retrospect, we were in a bubble economy in
1999.
95. Because over-indebtedness is such a complex phenomenon, many
solutions would be necessary to address it. The financial literacy movement is
one response. See Lois A. VITT ET AL., PERSONAL FINANCE AND THE RUSH TO
COMPETENCE: FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION IN THE U.S., INSTITUTE FOR
SOCIO-FINANCIAL STUDIES STUDY, COMMISSIONED AND SUPPORTED BY THE
FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION (2000) (reporting that most programs started only
recently). But financial literacy can only go so far to reduce over-indebtedness.
See Michele Dickerson, Can Shame, Guilt or Stigma Be Taught? Why Credit-
Focused Debtor Education May Not Work, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 945, 958-59
(1999) (noting that "debtor education programs do little for debtors who become
economically disabled because they lack marketable job skills, health insurance
or are not receiving timely child support payments").
96. See James M. Ackerman, Interest Rates and the Law: A History of Usury,
27 ARIZ. ST. U. L. REv. 61 (1981) (tracing the history of usury restrictions to
ancient cultures and recounting the story of the gradual acceptance of lending at
interest for productive purposes such as farming and then trade and only much
later acceptance of high rates of interest for lending for consumer consumption);
see also Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer
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side constraints on consumer credit in recent years, we face the
long-term task of changing demand, assuming we are interested in
reducing over-indebtedness at all.'
IV. CURRENT AND PROPOSED MEANS TESTING
No system can catch every abuser, and our current system
already screens out most potential abuse. The means chosen for
means testing should not burden "can't pay" debtors with costs
they cannot afford, barring them from the relief bankruptcy is
intended to provide. Reform could improve our bankruptcy
system, but the proposals that have been made are not well
designed. They would burden even the worst off, while leaving
some inequities and potential abuse in place, and risk bringing the
system to its knees with new, often pointless paperwork.
A. Current Repayment and Means Testing
Two features of our current system limit the gains in
repayment that means-testing reform can achieve. One is that
most Chapter 7 debtors do not get a pure fresh start now. They
pay some of their old debt, either with formal reaffirmations, by
"ride through" with court protection, or simply because of informal
acquiescence by creditors.98 Thus, many Chapter 7 debtors already
Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to
Current Thinking about the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L.
REv. 589 (2000) (describing traps debtors fall into with auto-title pawn loans and
payday loans, among other newer forms of consumer credit, and noting that the
high cost of consumption using these kinds of credit makes fringe borrowers'
attempts to improve their economic status like "trying to go up a descending
escalator").
97. One might see over-indebtedness as a mass psycho-social or moral
problem, or simply as a change in norms. See Carol Ann Curnock, Insolvency
Counselling-Innovation Based on the Fourteenth Century, 37 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 387, 394 (arguing, in the context of a critique of the premises of the Canadian
requirement of counseling for consumer debtors, for the need to "ask what
differentiates a 'psycho-social problem' from a norm").
9& See Culhane & White, Reaffirmation, supra note 6 (concerning
repayment in Chapter 7); NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 167-68 (noting that
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get what Professor William Whitford has called a "stale start."99
Furthermore, we should recognize that some sifting of potential
abusers from can't pay debtors is already going on. For these
reasons, means-testing reform can at most achieve only fine tuning
rather than major gains in catching the unworthy and making them
undertake a repayment plan if they want a discharge. For marginal
gains, it makes no sense to impose huge new burdens and costs.
There is already a provision for dismissal under Section 707(b)
for "substantial abuse." This provision, added by the 1984
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, avoids any specific means
test.'O' Many courts have interpreted it to bar debtors from
Chapter 7 if they could pay a substantial amount of their unsecured
debt in Chapter 13.11 This provision has not proved burdensome in
practice. Although there are variations in how different courts
interpret the test, local practitioners only have to worry about local
decisions, greatly reducing the uncertainty that is experienced in
practice. Furthermore, attorneys in flat fee practice avoid
uncertainty by steering far clear of gray areas."°
Under current law, only a U.S. trustee or judge can bring a
substantial abuse challenge. 3 Many U.S. trustees run all Chapter 7
cases through a check for substantial abuse using a rule of thumb.
For example, cases might get close scrutiny if the debtor's
schedules show that the debtor could pay fifty percent of
unsecured debt in a three-year Chapter 13. This sort of test takes
into account that currently debtors in consumer bankruptcy are
prone to understate their expenses.' If more of them had a better
ride-through is the norm for home mortgage obligations in Chapter 7).
99. See William C. Whitford, Changing Definitions of Fresh Start in U.S.
Bankruptcy Law, 20 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 179 (1997).
100. See Michael D. Bruckman, The Thickening Fog of "Substantial Abuse;"
Can 707(a) Help Clear the Air? 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 193 (1994); see also
Wayne R. Wells et al., The Implementation of Bankruptcy Code 707(b): The Law
and the Reality, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 15 (1991).
101. See In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988); see also In re Walton, 866
F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989).
102. See generally Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note
12.
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000).
104. See Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 12, at 536;
see also Braucher, Debtor Education, supra note 11, at 574.
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grip on their budgets, they might not be in bankruptcy to begin
with. Also contributing to the problem of inaccurate schedules is
the minimal amount of time counsel put into cases done for small
flat-fees."°5 Attorneys learn quickly what sort of disposable income
shown by schedules will easily pass U.S. trustee scrutiny and have
no trouble getting most of their clients past the applicable screen.
If we really had many debtors trying to discharge debts despite
ability to pay them, the substantial abuse test could be mobilized;
but the evidence is that it is little used because there is little
abuse."°
Another check on abuse is the fact that debtors lose
nonexempt assets in Chapter 7' This feature of Chapter 7 works
as a proxy for means testing, in that most people with means for a
significant period, accumulate nonexempt assets (for example,
savings and investments in a stock portfolio) and have that
incentive to avoid Chapter 7. They also have an incentive to avoid
Chapter 13. Section 1325(a)(4) requires debtors to pay at least the
value of their nonexempt assets in Chapter 13,"w and they must pay
their disposable income after reasonably necessary expenses under
Section 1325(b) to avoid confirmation challenges."
Exemptions are more generous in some states than in others,
so the incorporation of state exemption law into federal
bankruptcy law inevitably leads to a lack of uniformity nationally."'
Most states have opted out of the federal bankruptcy exemptions,
so that only the state exemptions are available."' A handful of
states permit an unlimited homestead exemption, permitting a few
105. See Steven W. Rhodes, An Empirical Study of Consumer Bankruptcy
Papers, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 653 (1999) (finding lack of care in fulfilling
disclosure requirements, with many missing and inconsistent items).
106. See supra Culhane & White, Means Testing, supra note 4, at 31; see also
supra notes 42, 61-62 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 2.
108. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2000).
109. Id. § 1325(b).
110. See Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note
65, at 15.
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (authorizing states to opt out of federal
bankruptcy exemptions, so that only state exemptions are available); see also
NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 299-301 (listing thirty-three states as having
opted out).
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high-end debtors a year to shelter large homes in these states (the
palace in Dallas). ' The Senate version of the proposed legislation
would have capped the homestead exemption at $125,000, and
remarkably, this cap was controversial; a conference committee
eliminated it except for certain debtors, such as convicted felons
and violators of securities laws, and also approved a bar on use of a
state's homestead exemption for debtors who have moved there
within forty months. 113 Still, under the conference committee
approach, some debtors would be able to make use of an unlimited
homestead exemption in bankruptcy. It is hard to take seriously
the idea that the purpose of reform is to stamp out abuse if some
high-end debtors get to shelter millions of dollars in a homestead.
This is largely a symbolic issue, in that most debtors in bankruptcy
with a home have little or no home equity."'4
B. Provisions of the Proposed Legislation
This examination of the provisions of the proposed legislation
will focus on demonstrating that they are complex and confusing
and would burden even those debtors most in need of a fresh start,
without catching all abuse.
112. See id. (showing five states as having unlimited homestead exemption,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota and Texas.)
113. See Philip Shenon, Congress Panel Agrees to Limited Home Shield in
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at C1 (reporting that a conference
committee removed the general $125,000 homestead cap from the legislation but
retained it for some debtors, such as convicted felons or those with debts under
federal or state securities law, and also barred use of a homestead exemption by
anyone who had not lived in a state for at least forty months). This compromise
thus left in place use of unlimited state homestead exemptions for debtors not in
specified categories and who had not moved in forty months. The provision
concerning those with debts for securities law liability seemed intended to deal
with the possibility that a spate of former Enron executives might file for
bankruptcy in Texas and attempt to take advantage of the state's unlimited
homestead exemption, something they might still be able to accomplish before
the effective date of the legislation, assuming it passes.
114. See SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 31, at 221
(finding in sample of 1991 debtors in bankruptcy with homes had a median home
equity of $5500, with one quarter having no equity at all, compared to median
home equity of American homeowners generally as of that time of $43,078).
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1. No Threshold Median Income Test
An earlier version of the proposed legislation would have
excused debtors below the national median income from the need
to undergo more detailed means testing.' 5 This salutary provision,
from the perspective of workability, was eliminated from the
legislation in 1998.1"6 With a million or more debtors filing in
Chapter 7 a year, a quick, simple screen is needed to eliminate all
but the most likely candidates for repayment.11 7 The 2001 version
of the legislation would bring in a state median income test only
after the means-testing calculation is prepared, at the tail end of
the process, to determine whether creditors, in addition to judges
and trustees, could bring abuse challenges and also to determine
who is subject to a presumed abuse challenge."8
Every debtor would have to submit "a statement of the
amount of monthly net income, itemized to show how the amount
is calculated.""..9  A failure to do so would trigger automatic
115. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 101(1)(B)
(1998).
116. See CONFERENCE REPORT OF H.R. 3150, 105th Cong., §§ 101(3),
102(b)(2) & (5) (Oct. 30, 1998); see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R.
833 § 707(2)(A)(ii)(1999).
117. See Culhane & White, Means Testing, supra note 4, at 35 (arguing that
any means test needs a mechanism to quickly and simply free the can't-pay
majority to make a fresh start).
118. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. § 102 (July 17,
2001). In April 2002, a conference committee resolved the differences between
the House and Senate versions of the legislation concerning the homestead
exemption. See Shenon, Congress Panel Agrees to Limited Home Shield in
Bankruptcy, supra note 113. Agreement had not been reached as of early May
on language to bar discharge of liability for abortion clinic violence. See id.; see
also Pro-Life Protesters' Misuse of Bankruptcy Laws, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2002,
at All (listing, in a letter to the editor from U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer,
instances of use of bankruptcy by radical anti-abortion activists, including
Randall Terry and Rev. Robert Behn and Bonnie Benn, in order to escape
judgments and fines).
119. S. 420 § 315. This provision is qualified by the phrase "unless the court
orders otherwise," but this does not provide a practical means to relieve below-
median income debtors of the need to submit the calculation; they would have to
pay for a court appearance to get a court order allowing them not to submit the
calculation.
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dismissal." Thus, no debtor would be spared the need to make
and submit a means-testing calculation.
2. Abuse and Presumed Abuse
The proposed legislation would reduce the test for dismissal
under Section 707(b) from "substantial abuse" to "abuse,"
generally indicating an intention to get tougher.12 1 It also would
permit creditors to bring abuse challenges if the debtor exceeds
state median income." In addition, abuse would be presumed if
"current monthly income," reduced by certain expense amounts,
and multiplied by sixty is not less than the lesser of (a) twenty-five
percent of unsecured claims or $6000, whichever is greater, or (b)
$10,000."z A debtor who had $100 in net monthly income (income
in excess of permitted expenses) would thus be a presumed abuser.
The expenses permitted to a debtor for purposes of the means-
testing calculation would include:
(a) expenses under IRS National and Local
Standards for housing, transportation, and food and
clothing. The IRS standards were developed as
guidelines for tax collection and are not in fact
rigidly applied in that context. One of the reasons
they are not rigidly applied is that there is a general
recognition that in many cases people cannot live on
them.24 Revealing a lack of confidence in the
120. Id. § 316.
121. Id. § 102.
122. See id. Under current law, only U.S. trustees and judges may bring
substantial abuse challenges. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).
123. The $10,000 test makes a presumed abuser of anyone who could pay
about $170 per month, even though that would be less than 25% of the debtor's
unsecured debt.
124. See Jack Williams, Ruminating on the Proposed Bankruptcy Bill, 20 AM.
BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2001, at 6; see also Gary Klein, Impact of Pending
Bankruptcy Legislation on Low-Income Debtors, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 35
(2000) (noting that the IRS developed its standards to serve as discretionary
guides rather than absolute requirements and that the guides are subject to
multiple exceptions, rendering them inappropriate for a statutory test) Because
they are so stringent, application of the IRS standards would create a need to
prove higher expenses in many cases under the special circumstances phase of
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wisdom of using the IRS standards in bankruptcy,
the legislation includes a provision directing the
Executive Office for United States Trustees to study
and submit a report to Congress on the expenses of
debtors under section 707(b), as amended, and the
impact of the standards on debtors and the
bankruptcy courts.'5 It might have been advisable
to do a study of the suitability of the IRS standards
before drafting the legislation to incorporate them;
(b) actual expenses in categories listed by the IRS
standards as "other necessary expenses;"
(c) an additional five percent of the IRS food and
clothing standards if reasonable and necessary;
(d) actual reasonable and necessary expenses for an
elderly or disabled household member;
(e) "actual" administrative expenses of a
hypothetical Chapter 13 case for the debtor. The
legislation directs the Executive Office for the
United States Trustees to issue schedules concerning
these expenses for each judicial district of the U.S.;"
(f) actual reasonable and necessary private school
expenses up to $1500 per year per child;
(g) actual reasonable and necessary expenses for
home energy costs in excess of IRS local standards;
(h) amounts due to secured creditors for sixty
months after the petition date, plus additional
review, see infra Part IV.B.4 (noting that debtors would have practical difficulty
making this proof because of the added expense).
125. S. 420 § 103(b).
126. Id. § 107.
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amounts necessary to retain a residence, motor
vehicle or other necessary property in a Chapter 13
(this is a reference to arrearage payments). The
total is divided by sixty for the calculation;
(i) priority claim amounts, such as child support and
tax obligations. Again, the total amount due is
divided by sixty months for the calculation.
It is noteworthy that many of these expenses would call for
court review - either of how much the actual expense is or
whether it is reasonable and necessary. Thus, "reasonableness"
would come into play even during the first phase of the means-
testing process. The presumed abuse test is not something that
could be applied mechanically.
3. "Current Monthly Income"
For purposes of the presumed abuse test, "current monthly
income" is not actual current monthly income. Rather, it is an
average of the last six months' income received by the debtor and,
in a joint case, the debtor's spouse." This would have some odd
effects for debtors whose income either went up or down but
would not continue to fluctuate. In many cases, the look-back
approach would not accurately indicate future ability to pay.
Debtors also would be required to report "any reasonably
anticipated increase" in income for the next twelve months,"
although this is not taken into account in the presumed abuse test
but could be the basis for an abuse challenge without the
presumption. What should be "reasonably anticipated" is yet
another interpretation question.
4. Rebuttal of Presumption
In a second phase of review, a debtor could rebut a
presumption of abuse by showing "special circumstances" that
"justify additional expenses or adjustment of current monthly
127. Id. § 102.
128. Id. § 315.
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income for which there is no reasonable alternative."' 29 Thus, the
first strict phase of review could be followed by a second phase in
which individual circumstances and the reasonableness of expenses
and the amount of actual income would be considered. This two-
step process would put a burden on many debtors to engage in
special pleading. A body of case law, probably varying around the
country, could be expected to develop concerning when "presumed
abusers" can proceed in Chapter 7 due to special circumstances,
but debtors would still have to prepare the means-testing
calculation under first stage review process to get to the second
stage and attempt to overcome a finding of presumed abuse. The
realities of low, flat fee practice are that lawyers are quick to avoid
the need for special showings with uncertain results. Thus, under
the legislation, one would expect to see more lawyers putting
marginal clients straight into Chapter 13, even though these
debtors' true and reasonable expenses would make them unlikely
to succeed in repaying old debt. This is one reason the Chapter 13
failure rate would likely rise.
5. Below Median Income Debtors
Under the legislation, a presumed abuse challenge could not
be brought against a debtor who is below median income for the
debtor's family size in the debtor's state, and only a judge or
trustee could bring an abuse challenge against such a debtor. 13
Judges and trustees would be unlikely to bring abuse challenges
against below-median income debtors, yet these debtors would
have to go through the burden of preparing a means-testing
calculation showing net monthly income after permitted expenses,
on pain of automatic dismissal.' Attorneys preparing the
calculation would face new liability.' 2 Furthermore, even though a
presumed abuse challenge could not be brought against these
debtors, the U.S. trustee apparently would have to file a statement
as to whether each below-median-income debtor passed the
129. Id. § 102.
130. Id. § 102(a)(6)-(7).
131. Id. 420 §§ 102,315(b) & 316.
132. See infra Part IV.B.8.
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presumed abuse test and provide a copy of this statement to all
creditors.13 1 The legislation could have avoided imposing the costs
of pointless paperwork, on debtors and U.S. trustees, by making
debtors with income below the state median not subject to abuse
challenges and by not requiring them to submit expenses under the
means-testing calculation.
6. Means Test Applicable in Chapter 13
A debtor who is above the state median income for a family of
that size would have to use IRS expense standards to determine
expenses under the disposable income test of Section 1325(b).
Because the IRS standards are so stringent,3 ' these debtors would
have trouble keeping to their budgets and thus would be more
likely to fail to complete their plans. Realistic budgets are key to
plan success. "6 Also, debtors above median income would have to
undertake five-year plans unless they could make full payment in
less time, up from three-year plans under the current disposable
income test.' With five-year plans, there is more opportunity for
financial problems that prevent plan completion.
The anti-cramdown features of the proposed legislation'38
would have complex effects on use of Chapter 13 that are hard to
predict. The legislation would require full debt repayment on
certain collateral even though the collateral is worth less than the
debt and repayment of retail replacement value for all other
collateral in individual cases.'39 This would mean that Chapter 13
debtors would have to pay more to keep cars and other personal
133. See infra Part IV.B.7.
134. S. 420 § 102.
135. See Williams, supra note 124, at 7.
136. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
137. Compare S. 420 § 318 with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2000).
138. S. 420 § 306 (requiring full debt repayment on purchase money
obligations for a car acquired within three years before the bankruptcy filing and
anything else acquired within one year before filing, even if the collateral is worth
less than the debt); id. § 326 (setting the value of personal property collateral in
individual cases in Chapters 7 and 13 at "replacement value," defined as "the
price a retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age
and condition of the property at the time value is determined.").
139. Id. §§ 306 & 326.
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property collateral (ciamdown on home mortgages is already
prohibited). Keeping personal property collateral would be less
affordable in Chapter 13 than it is now. As a result, more debtors
might propose unrealistic plans to try to save cars, and as a result,
more might fail to complete their plans. It is hard to know whether
Chapter 13 filings would decline. It is possible that because of the
anti-cramdown provisions, below-median income debtors might be
more likely than under current law to reaffirm in Chapter 7, with
discharge of unsecured debts. On the other hand, if lawyers started
to put more debtors directly into Chapter 13 because of the cost of
going through means testing in Chapter 7, we might see more
Chapter 13 filings by below-median income debtors." Their
budgets would be stretched by the need to pay more to keep
collateral, primarily cars, producing more failures.
7. Paper Work.
Here is a non-exclusive list of additional paperwork that
would be required under the legislation:
- As already noted, every debtor who filed in Chapter 7
would have to submit a means-testing calculation, even debtors
below median income, and failure to file the calculation would
make a debtor subject to automatic dismissal.'
- Every debtor in either chapter would have to submit a tax
return.12  Trustees now often ask for a tax return at the first
meeting of creditors, but this is not part of the court file and also is
not something the debtor must produce to avoid dismissal.
Because of the impact on privacy of the tax return requirement
(e.g., names of dependents, Social Security numbers of taxpayer
and dependents), the legislation directs the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts to develop procedures to safeguard tax
information and to prepare and submit to Congress a report
assessing the effectiveness of its procedures.' 3
140. See Williams, supra note 124 (predicting that the legislation would either
make a failed Chapter 13 a de facto prerequisite to Chapter 7 or that debtors
would go underground and avoid repayment without benefit of bankruptcy).
141. S. 420 §§ 102, 315(b) & 316.
142 Id. §§ 315(e)(2) & 316.
143. Id. § 315(h)(1).
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- In every Chapter 7 case, the U.S. trustee would have to file
a statement as to whether the debtor's case would be a presumed
abuse, and the court would be required to provide a copy of this
statement to all creditors.'" There is no exception for below
median income debtors, even though presumed abuse challenges
could not be brought against them. With about a million consumer
debtors a year filing in bankruptcy, 5 these requirements would
create a lot of paperwork and a lot of mail. Filing such a statement
for every debtor is just one of the new jobs for U.S. trustees that
will require new staff.'4'
8. Sanctions -for Debtors' Lawyers
Sanctions (payment for the costs of a dismissal action,
including attorneys' fees, plus a civil penalty) could be awarded
against a debtor's counsel if a case is dismissed as an abuse under
Section 707(b) as amended and the court finds that the attorney
violated Rule 9011 (the bankruptcy equivalent to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11)."47 Giving this provision real punch is its
statement that the attorney's signature on the petition
"constitute[s] a certification that the attorney has... performed a
reasonable investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to
the petition.., and... determined that the petition.., is well
grounded in fact ... and ... does not constitute an abuse." 148 A
possible interpretation of this language is that the attorney must
conduct an investigation of the underlying facts. At its August
2001 meeting, the ABA House of Delegates voted to oppose the
attorney sanctions provision of the legislation.' 9 The ABA was
attuned to the ways in which this language interferes with the
normal attorney-client relationship, in which an attorney may
assume that a client is telling the truth absent information to the
144. Id. § 102.
145. See Bankruptcy Filings Set Record in 2001, supra note 6.
146. See also infra pp. 442-44 (providing further examples of additional work
created for the U.S. Trustee which would require new staff).
147. See S. 420 § 102.
14& Id.
149. See Bankruptcy Reform: ABA Opposes Bankruptcy Bill Provisions,
Supports More Use of Unpublished Decisions, BANKR. L. DAILY, Aug. 24, 2001.
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contrary and is not required to investigate the client.50 The
language seems to require the attorney to investigate the
underlying facts, such as the debtor's income and expenses.
9. Pre-Filing Debt Counseling and Preparation of a Budget
An individual debtor, to be eligible for bankruptcy in any
chapter, would have to receive budget and credit counseling within
the previous six months from a nonprofit agency that assisted the
individual in performing a budget analysis.' There are exceptions
to this requirement of counseling for when the debtor has exigent
circumstances and could not obtain counseling within five days of a
request (there is no provision for an excuse within less than five
days, for example to stop a foreclosure) and for districts where the
U.S. trustee determines services are unavailable."' Debtors subject
to the counseling requirement would have to submit a certificate
from the agency concerning receipt of the required services and a
copy of a debt repayment plan, if any, developed by the agency.'
To qualify as an approved agency, a credit: counseling agency's fees
must be "reasonable" and they must provide services "without
regard to ability to pay the fee."'" It is not clear that existing
consumer credit counseling services will want to apply to help
prepare people for bankruptcy. Credit counseling agencies,
although non-profit organizations, are usually creditor-funded.'55
150. See id. (quoting the ABA resolution as criticizing the attorney liability
provision for making bankruptcy work "dramatically riskier" for lawyers, as well
as more expensive for clients, because it requires certification of accuracy.)
151. S. 420 § 106.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Howard B. Hoffman, Consumer Bankruptcy Filers and Pre-Petition
Consumer Credit Counseling: Is Congress Trying to Place the Fox in Charge of the
Henhouse?, 54 Bus. LAW. 1629, 1630-32 (1999) (stating that although run on a
nonprofit basis, consumer credit counseling agencies ordinarily receive funding
from creditors and that funding is based on a percentage of money recovered).
Another problem with credit counseling is unrealistic plans. See id. at 1632, 1634-
40 (noting that because creditors typically demand full repayment, debt
management plans proposed by credit counselors are often unrealistic and
unduly burdensome); see also Gordon Bermant, Planning for Change: Credit
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10. Debtor Education as a Condition of Discharge
As a condition of discharge, all debtors in Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 would have to take a course in personal financial
management. " ' There is an exception for districts where the U.S.
trustee has determined that there are not adequate services for all
debtors." Financial management courses could be given by for-
profit entities."8 The legislation provides no funding for counseling
or education, so at least some debtors would end up paying for
these services themselves.
11. Supervision of Counseling and Debtor Education Agencies
The legislation assigns the U.S. trustees supervisory authority
over the agencies used by debtors in bankruptcy to satisfy the
counseling and financial management education requirements.
The legislation provides for evaluation and annual approval after
"thorough review."'
59
12. Homestead Cap
Although the Senate approved a cap on the homestead
exemption of $125,000,'" this general cap was compromised in the
conference committee in favor of a cap applicable only to certain
debtors such as those convicted of felonies or liable under federal
Counseling at the Threshold of Bankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 21 (2001)
(finding credit counseling agencies in one district used budget expense
allowances even smaller than those in the IRS allowances); David A. Lander,
Essay: A Snapshot of Two Systems That Are Trying to Help People in Financial
Trouble, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 161, 178-81 (1999) (noting debt
management plans typically require full debt payout and that, as of 1998, in forty-
eight percent of plans, debtor stopped paying within first six months, sometimes
in response to continued collection efforts by some creditors).
156. S. 420 § 106.
157. The exceptions for both counseling and debtor education when services
are not available might be unnecessary because telephone and Internet services
suffice for either requirement.
158. S. 420 § 106.
159. Id.
160. Id. § 308.
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or state securities laws. 6' The conference proposal also barred used
of a homestead exemption by anyone who had not lived in a state
for forty months before filing. 162 This would still permit some
debtors to make use of an unlimited homestead exemption,
although most debtors in bankruptcy have little or no home
equity."' This issue is largely symbolic, given that very few debtors
who file in bankruptcy have even $125,000 in home equity or other
assets to put into a homestead in order to protect them. Still,
having a high homestead exemption cap, or no limit at all,
undercuts claims that the legislation is intended to force those with
the means to do so to repay their debts.
C. Summary of Problems with the Legislation and Examples
Many of the problems with the legislation are indicated above.
To summarize, all cases would cost more to process, for debtors
and their attorneys and the system, even when debtors are below
median income. Debtors, who are often disorganized, would have
to get tax returns on file with the court to avoid dismissal.
Attorneys would probably raise their fees because of the increased
paperwork and risk of liability, at least initially. The presumed
abuse calculation raises many questions of fact and mixed
questions of fact and law (for example, what amounts are
"reasonable and necessary" in certain categories). Where the first
stage of review finds presumed abuse, there is a second stage
possible to determine whether special circumstances justify
adjustments to income or expenses, with the burden on the debtor
to rebut a presumption of abuse. While the presumed abuse test is
rigid and tough (for example, because of use of the IRS standards
for expenses), it is subject to discretionary review in this "special
circumstances" inquiry, but the two-step process (presumed
161. See Shenon, supra note 113.
162 See id.
163. Although one can find reported cases involving high-income debtors who
have sheltered large amounts in homes, these are outliers to the great mass of
consumer debtors. One-quarter of homeowners in bankruptcy have no equity,
and more than two-thirds are "house poor" under Fannie Mae guidelines for
housing expenditures. SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 31,
at 221, 218-19.
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abuse/special circumstances) would require debtors to be able to
pay for litigation to avoid dismissal. The U.S. trustees and their
umbrella agency, the Executive Office for the U.S. Trustees, would
have many new duties to execute and studies to make. Trustees
would have to file statements concerning abuse in every Chapter 7
case and oversee credit counseling and financial management
education for all debtors in both chapters. The bankruptcy
bureaucracy would swell. Some debtors who need relief would not
be able to afford it, and there would be more Chapter 13 failures as
lawyers put more clients directly into Chapter 13 to avoid the costs
and uncertainties under Chapter 7.
To get a feel for how these provisions might work, consider
three examples:
Example 1
Debtor received $3000 per month in income for the last six
months. (This is $36,000 a year). Debtor has monthly expenses,
under the IRS standards and other means-testing calculations, of
$2900. Debtor, a single mother with one child, has $30,000 in
unsecured debts from credit cards and uninsured medical expenses
due to a serious illness and hospitalization her child suffered while
Debtor was out of work last year. (Studies indicated that about
two-thirds of debtors report job disruptions as a cause of their
bankruptcies,' and nearly half of bankruptcies involve medical
problems).' 6 Assume Debtor falls above median income for a
family of two in her state. Because Debtor has $100 per month in
"excess income," she is a presumed abuser who (in theory) could
pay $6000 in a five-year Chapter 13 case (her payments would be
less than twenty-five percent of unsecured debt). Debtor might
attempt to rebut the presumption of abuse. She could argue, for
example, that she has higher transportation costs than the IRS
standards because she must drive a long distance to work and that
the IRS standards do not cover her actual food and clothing
expenses, which she maintains are reasonable. Presumably, her
lawyer would charge more for this sort of case than for a Chapter 7
under current law, and Debtor might not be able to afford the
164. Id. at 15-21.
165. See Jacoby et al., supra note 91, at 377.
445
446 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
higher fee. Alternatively, her lawyer might put her directly into a
five-year Chapter 13 with disposable income calculated under the
IRS standards. Under current law, probably no judge or U.S.
trustee would bring a "substantial abuse" challenge against this
debtor.
For a variation on Example 1, assume instead that Debtor is
part of a family of four and is below median income. Debtor is not
subject to a presumed abuse challenge but must still submit a
means-testing calculation, which her lawyer must certify after
investigation, and also a copy of a tax return. If Debtor receives
income that is difficult to verify (tips, for example), the lawyer may
be nervous about the certification. The greater paperwork and risk
for the lawyer would likely raise the attorney's fee. Debtor would
have to go through credit counseling before filing and debtor
education afterward. The additional costs and burdens as a
practical matter might mean no access to bankruptcy.
Example 2
Debtor makes $50,000 a year. Assume that is above the state
median income. The calculation of Debtor's income compared to
expenses shows $500 in surplus income. If, however, Debtor had
recently bought a new car on which he pays $450 per month, the
surplus income would be reduced to $50. That means $3000 is
available (in theory) over five years ($600 per year), so that Debtor
could pass the means test if he has more than $12,000 in unsecured
debt (so that he would pay less than twenty-five percent of
unsecured debt in five years). This example illustrates that debtors
with more secured and unsecured debt pass the presumed abuse
test more easily. It is odd that legislation supposedly designed to
catch abuse makes it easier to qualify for bankruptcy by buying a
new car.
66
Example 3
Debtor made $72,000 per year take-home pay working as an
assistant hotel manager. Debtor was laid off a month ago and has
just gone back to work supervising banquet set-up at half his old
166. A creditor could still charge abuse, but a "totality of the circumstances"
test would apply. S. 420 § 102(a).
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salary. For the first five months of the "current monthly income"
period, Debtor's income will be $6000, and for the last month it
will be zero, for a calculation of $5000 per month in current
monthly income. On $5000 a month, Debtor exceeds the
presumed abuse test and is above median income. He can attempt
to rebut the presumption of abuse by showing the "special
circumstance" of actual income of $3000.
Debtor, who is hoping to get bumped back up into senior
management of the hotel when business picks up, has an
application in for his old position and has been told there is a good
chance that he will get it in six months, when the busy season gets
into full swing. There would be a difficult issue of whether to
report a "reasonably anticipated increase" in income within twelve
months.
(A variation is a debtor who manages to file just before getting
a new job, after being out of work for six months. This debtor
would have zero income under the means test and would easily
pass it. Timing of one's bankruptcy filing is strategically important
under this income definition involving a six month look-back, an
approach that will sometimes either over- or understate means to
pay in the future.)
V. THE NEED FOR SIMPLIFICATION, INCLUDING A SINGLE PORTAL
The current consumer bankruptcy system is much too
complex. Examination of how the two main consumer options,
Chapters 7 and 13, are actually used reveals that they lack
distinctive characters.'67 The two chapters are not separating the
"can" from the "can't" pay.'6 A major reason for use of Chapter 13
is to hold on to collateral, but debtors who have not defaulted on
secured obligations can often do that in Chapter 7, either by court-
protected ride-through or because of creditor acquiescence."9
Debtors who retain collateral in Chapter 7 do not have to
167. See Braucher, Increasing Uniformity, supra note 65, at 11-14 (describing
consumer bankruptcy law as providing a complex mix of overlapping options).
168. See SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE, supra note 4, at 239-40.
169. See Culhane & White, Reaffirmation, supra note 6 (explaining that a
majority of sample debtors with homes and cars held on to them in Chapter 7
without reaffirming).
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undertake repayment plans, as Chapter 13 debtors do, typically
including some portion of unsecured debts.7 ° As a result, under
current law, some of the worst off debtors, those who have
defaulted on secured obligations, end up in Chapter 13 as the only
way to hold on to a house or car, and they are then saddled with
arrearage payments on overdue secured debt as well as partial
repayment of unsecured debt.17'
Furthermore, the image that Chapter 7 involves a pure fresh
start and Chapter 13 involves repaying unsecured debts is flawed.
Some repayment goes on in both chapters, and it is by no means
clear that more repayment occurs in Chapter 13, when one takes
into account failed plans and plans with minimal repayment to
unsecured creditors. and also the repayment that occurs in
Chapter 7173
The proposed legislation would take this confused and
confusing system and make it more complicated and more onerous
to debtors, even the worst off and most clearly in need of a fresh
start, despite absence of evidence of new abuse. 17  The resulting
law would increase costs for all, denying access to bankruptcy at
the margin and putting more can't-pay debtors into repayment
plans that fail.' Yet the law would fail to stop manipulations that
allow some can-pay debtors to escape repayment.' Simplification
is needed. A single portal into bankruptcy is an obvious key
element in a workable solution.
Elizabeth Warren, the reporter for the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission, briefly floated the idea of a single consumer
170. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2000) (requiring commitment of disposable
income to payment plan for three years to avoid confirmation challenge, unless
debtor is paying creditors one hundred percent of their debts in less time).
171. See id. §§ 1325(b) & 1322(b)(5) (concerning curing defaults).
172 See supra note 9 (concerning non-completion rate in Chapter 13);
Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy, supra note 12, at 531-32
(concerning local variations in acceptability of low percentage plans in Chapter
13).
173. See supra note 6.
174. See supra Part II.
175. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text; see also Part IV.B.6.
176. See supra Part IV.C, Ex. 2.
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chapter, called Basic Bankruptcy. '77  The organized affected
interests all disliked the idea.'78 Debtors' lawyers stood to lose
Chapter 13 business, and Chapter 13 trustees stood to lose their
posts. ' Creditors would gain more from means testing Chapter 7,
pressuring more debtors into the troubled Chapter 13 system,
which produces many fewer discharges than filings, and deterring
some debtors from filing at all. 8' Also, because the particular
single chapter proposed as Basic Bankruptcy was in essence
Chapter 7, with options added to pay over time to keep collateral
or to make voluntary payment to unsecured creditors, at first blush
it appeared too debtor-oriented.' But the single portal idea has
177. See Basic Bankruptcy Concept Being Considered by the Consumer
Bankruptcy Working Group, 6 CONS. BANKR. NEWS, Sept. 12, 1996, at 2
[hereinafter Basic Bankruptcy] (providing a summary prepared by Elizabeth
Warren, reporter for the National Bankruptcy Review Commission and also
Harvard Law School professor, concerning proposal considered by the
commission).
178. See NACBA Expresses Disappointment with Basic Bankruptcy Proposal,
6 CONS. BANKR. NEWS 4 (Oct. 10, 1996) (concerning opposition of National
Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys) and NACTT Responds to Basic
Bankruptcy Plan, 6 CONS. BANKR. NEWS, Sept. 26, 1996, at 3 (concerning
opposition of National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees).
179. The reasons given by the NACBA and NACTT, see supra note 178, were
not self-interested, but rather focused on arguments that current law is working
well and that non-uniformity in application of bankruptcy law is an inevitable
consequence of judicial discretion, which has the salutary effect of permitting
adaptation to different state laws and regional economic conditions. NACTT
further noted that the Basic Bankruptcy concept was supported only by
"academicians." (A law professor knows she is in trouble when she is called an
"academician."). See NACTT Responds to Basic Bankruptcy Plan, supra note
178. However, the idea of a single portal did receive an endorsement from a
prominent bankruptcy judge. NCBJ President Offers His Vision of a Single
Chapter Consumer Bankruptcy System, 6 CONS. BANKR. NEWS, Oct. 24, 1996, at 5
(concerning proposal of Judge Robert D. Martin of the Western District of
Wisconsin for a single chapter, involving nonexempt asset surrender by all
debtors, with option for installment redemption of collateral and further option
for payment of disposable income for forty-eight months to get superdischarge,
including of obligations for taxes, alimony and support).
180. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
181. As summarized by Professor Warren, see supra note 177, the Basic
Bankruptcy concept would have involved having all debtors file in one chapter
and receive a discharge. Under the concept, there would be other, delinked
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merit apart from the details of the Basic Bankruptcy concept."' A
single portal is probably the only way to do a better job both of
providing reasonably consistent treatment for the similarly situated
and identifying, at least cost, those who realistically could afford to
use part of current income to repay old debt.
Both current and proposed means testing use an approach in
which the more debt one has, the less likely one is to have to repay.
Currently under the "substantial abuse" test, both case law and the
informal practices of U.S. trustees operating under rules of thumb
consider what percentage of unsecured debt a Chapter 7 debtor
could repay in Chapter 13.183 The means testing in the proposed
legislation would continue this approach, by excluding a debtor
from Chapter 7 if that debtor could pay twenty-five percent of
unsecured debt in five years and, more importantly, by deducting
secured claim amounts from income to determine ability to
repay." ' It is perverse to require repayment of debtors because
they have incurred less debt than others. Incurring more secured
debt is a way to pass the presumed abuse test of the proposed
legislation.'85 Other expenses would, to some extent, be objectively
judged (under the IRS standards) on this first cut, but some
expenses would be determined by "actual" and "reasonable"
options in bankruptcy-curing a home mortgage, paying for a car to keep it, and
voluntary repayment to general creditors (with a special benefit for those who
repaid 100%, that a credit reporting agency could not continue to list the
bankruptcy). See id. There were also a few "get tough" aspects to the concept-
eliminating the ability to refile for six years after dismissal and instituting random
audits of debtors' schedules. See id.
182. The idea of a single portal predates the Basic Bankruptcy concept.
Kenneth Klee, then chair of the National Bankruptcy Conference's legislative
committee and now a law professor at the University of California at Los
Angeles, suggested it in 1994, in conjunction with a proposal to have an
administrative agency handle consumer bankruptcy cases. See Should Consumer
Bankruptcy Be An Administrative Procedure? 4 CONS. BANKR. NEWS, Nov. 10,
1994 (concerning Klee's proposal and tracing it to a study by the Brookings
Institution in the 1960s recommending that an administrative agency be
responsible for determining which debtors are entitled to relief and the form of
relief and for administering cases).
183. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
184. See S. 420 § 102; see supra Parts IV.B.2 & C., Ex.2.
185. See supra Parts IV.B.2. & C., Ex. 2.
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expenses, so that upping expenses would help to pass the test. If a
debtor failed the presumed abuse test and went on to the rebuttal
phase, the debtor still could try to get higher expenses approved
based on special circumstances."6
Chapter 13 system has a similar problem. The more
"reasonably necessary" expenses a debtor has, the less disposable
income he has and the less he must pay. The proposed legislation
continues this approach for those at or below state median
income.187 For those above median income, it would use the
presumed abuse test for Chapter 7 to determine ability to pay,
188
thus incorporating its elements making payment depend on
secured debt and some expenses at actual and reasonable levels, or
determined on the basis of special circumstances.
An approach that might be fairer and easier to administer
would be to make repayment depend primarily on income, but
with enough leeway that there is no need to have many debtors
resorting to special pleading, as in the rebuttal phase of the
proposed means testing. Setting required repayment as a
percentage of income fits this bill.'89 A fine-tuned approach might
use a sliding scale, with a graduated percentage of income as
income rises." A rougher approach would set a percentage
repayment above an income threshold, such as state median
income. In addition to its greater fairness, an advantage of an
income-based repayment requirement is that it reduces the need
for judicial inquiry into lifestyle choices. 9'
An income-based approach is used in Australia, where the
186. See supra Part IV.B.2.
187. See S. 420 § 102.
18& See id.
189. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission came up with such a
proposal for Chapter 13-that unsecured debt repayment be set by a sliding
percentage of adjusted gross income, from a nominal amount for those with low
income (below $20,000) to five percent of adjusted gross income for debtors with
income in excess of $75,000. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 262-73. To
adapt this approach to a single portal form of consumer bankruptcy and to make
repayment realistic, the length of the repayment period should not be too long, as
is discussed in the text infra.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 263-64 (concerning differing judicial views of what expenses are
reasonably necessary).
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trustee in bankruptcy has the task of assessing a contribution of
half of debtors' income above a certain income threshold, which is
based on family size."9 The contribution goes to pay unsecured
creditors, and the assessment period is for twelve months and can
be renewed during the period until discharge, which typically
comes three years after the filing of a statement of affairs.9' This
system may appear more strict than ours, in that the discharge is
conditional on repayment. But it turns out that less than three
percent of Australian bankruptcy estates have an assessment made
against them.'94 The rest are below the income threshold. Those
who are assessed can bring a hardship appeal based on high
expenses or other reasons, a process pursued by very few debtors.'95
Since amendments to its bankruptcy law in 1997, Canada also
puts its debtors through a surplus income test.'96 As administered
by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, the Canadian approach
appears to set surplus income at a level that is problematic in more
cases than in Australia."9 There has been criticism that when the
192- See John Duns & Rosalind Mason, Consumer Insolvency in Australia, 10
INTERN. INSOLVENCY REV. 195, 212-13 (2001) (discussing implementation of
regime of automatic assessment of income contributions as of July 1992).
Australia also has alternatives to bankruptcy in the form of insolvency
arrangements or agreements, in which the debtor makes a proposal that is put to
a vote by creditors, with approval required by a majority in number and seventy-
five percent in amount). See id. at 224-25.
193. See id. at 213 (concerning mechanics of assessment); id. 217-18, 220
(noting that discharge is automatic after three years, unless it occurs by earlier
application or is postponed due to filing of objection; in 1999-2000, there were
7641 successful applications for early discharge and 301 objections to discharge).
Given that there were nearly 24,000 filings in bankruptcy in Australia in 2000-
2001, id. at 195, most discharges are automatic.
194. See id. at 216 (reporting that only 2.8% of bankruptcy estates under
administration for all or part of the year 1999-2000 had contributions assessed).
195. See id. (reporting that forty-four appeals of assessments were brought in
1999-2000, nineteen of them successful).
196. See Jacob S. Ziegel, The Philosophy and Design of Contemporary
Consumer Bankruptcy Systems: A Canada-US Comparison, 37 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 205, 225 (1999) (stating that trustee determines income after taxes and
certain other expenses such as child support and spousal maintenance, and then
living expenses based on a low-income standard are deducted).
197. See id. at 227 n.93 (reporting that initial data from Toronto in 1998, after
adoption of the surplus income test, indicated that 14.4% of debtors had surplus
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superintendent's guidelines for expenses seem inappropriate in a
particular case, the trustee has no discretion and the remedy
available is mediation and, failing that, a court hearing.' The
rigidity of the surplus income test is somewhat ameliorated by the
fact that when payment is required, it is typically for only nine
months after the debtor files a case. " Also, Canada uses the same
technique of requiring repayment of half of surplus income." In
Canada, half of the surplus income must be paid where the surplus
is from $100 to $1000; if monthly surplus income is less than $100,
no repayment is required."' Thus, for example, debtors with $300
in surplus income per month would have to pay $150 per month to
old creditors, leaving a $150 cushion against too stringent expense
figures used in the surplus income calculation.
In addition to some discontent with the surplus income test,
Canada's system is less than ideal for a number of other reasons,
including that trustees charge substantial fees to debtors even
though they in theory are fiduciaries for creditors' and that a
controversial counseling requirement has added administrative
costs to an already expensive systemn.'
If one applied family income thresholds, as in Australia, to
American debtors and set them at or slightly above median
income, it might be possible to efficiently pick out debtors most
likely to be able to pay something, allowing the others to proceed
to discharge with little interference.' Requiring debtors above the
income and 76.9% of those agreed to make monthly payments in accordance with
the standards, so that nearly a quarter of those assessed challenged the surplus
income determination).
198. See id. at 227.
199. See id. at 213, 230-31 (requiring payment from bankruptcy to discharge,
which occurs in nine months in first-time cases where no objection is filed).
200. See id. at 225.
201. See id.
202. See Ramsay, supra note 59, at 73 (providing for median trustee
remuneration of $1491); see also Ziegel, supra note 196, at 214-15 (noting
possible conflicts of interest).
203. See Ziegel, supra note 196, at 255; see also Ruth E. Berry, Counselling
Consumer Debtors Under Canada's Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 37 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 369 (1999); Curnock, supra note 97.
204. See Culhane & White, Means Testing, supra note 4, at 37 (using a national
median income test on real debtors in Chapter 7, about twenty-four percent were
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income thresholds to pay half of the excess, for nine or twelve
months, would be much more realistic than pushing them into five-
year plans requiring payment of all income in excess of stringent,
unrealistic expense guidelines. 5 An appropriate income threshold,
an assessment of half the excess for those above it, and a short,
achievable repayment period would minimize the need for special
hardship pleading and would also reduce failure. If all debtors
came through the same portal and were put through a reasonable
threshold income test, many debtors who currently try and fail to
repay in Chapter 13 would not be put through that humiliation
because they would be below the income threshold for
repayment.Y Chapter 13 debtors as a group are not better off than
Chapter 7 debtors,' and many are worse off. 8 Means testing
them, too, would eliminate a lot of the failure in repayment that
currently occurs. In a one-portal system, the income level for
repayment and amounts of repayment required could be set so
that, at the end of the day, a somewhat larger portion of debtors
would be required to make some repayment than currently succeed
in doing so.
CONCLUSION
If better means testing is wanted, attention needs to be paid to
the means of achieving it, so that the worst off and most in need of
at or above it). National median incomes are not a fine-tuned way to identify
potential can-pay debtors; those in high cost-of-living areas need higher incomes
than those in lower cost-of-living areas. See id. at 38. State medians, or even
better, more localized income thresholds, would be fairer.
205. See supra note 9 (concerning high failure rate in Chapter 13 currently,
under less stringent expense standards than would apply to debtors means tested
into Chapter 13 by the proposed legislation); see also Part IV.B.6 (concerning
applicability of means testing in Chapter 13 under proposed legislation).
206. See Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors, supra note 43, at 191
(noting blow to self-esteem from failing even in bankruptcy).
207. See SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE, supra note 4, at 239-40; see also
Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial
Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANRK. L.J. 121, 142
(1994) (noting that non-mortgage debt-income ratios for both Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 debtors were statistically indistinguishable between 1981 and 1991).
208. See text accompanying supra notes 167-171.
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a fresh start are not priced out of the consumer bankruptcy system.
One can think of ways to make the system simpler, fairer, less
expensive to administer, less costly to access and more
understandable to consumers. A single portal for consumer
debtors (rather than two options, Chapter 7 and Chapter 13) is key
to making these gains. A threshold income test for repayment
could then be applied to all debtors. Thinking about the design of
such a simplified system provides an interesting and revealing
contrast to the proposed legislation, which would be a step in the
wrong direction, making consumer bankruptcy even more
complicated, costly, and hard to understand than it already is.
Notes & Observations
